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IN THE SUPREME COURT OF THE STATE OF UTAH

R. C. TOLMAN CONSTRUCTION
COMPANY, INC.,

;

Plaintiff-Appellant,
Case No. 14,555
V.

1

MYTON WATER ASSOCIATION,
Defendant-Respondent

)
)

BRIEF OF DEFENDANT-RESPONDENT
STATEMENT OF THE KIND OF CASE
Action by plaintiff general contractor against defendant
water association for alleged breach of construction contract
and for quantum meriut covering construction of some 65 miles
of culinary water pipelines and five equalizing reservoirs and
pumping facilities in the rural area in and around Myton, Utah.
Defendant denied plaintiff's claims and by way of counter-claim,
defendant asserted a claim against plaintiff for liquidated
damages.
DISPOSITION IN THE LOWER COURT
The case was tried by Honorable J. Robert Bullock,
District Judge, sitting without a jury, on February 24-26, 1976
upon a stipulated Pretrial Order (R.16-19 incl.) and was argued
to the Court on February 27, 1976 (R.25).

On March 8, 1976 the

trial court issued its Memorandum Decision holding in favor
of the defendant and against the plaintiff on both counts of

plaintifffs complaint and holding in favor of defendant on its
counterclaim as to only $8,4 00.00 of liquidated damages retained
by defendant. (R.26, 27).
On April 5, 1976 the trial court entered its Findings
of Fact, Conclusions of Law (R.28-36 incl.) and Judgment of no
cause of action on the First Cause of Action of plaintiff's
complaint and dismissing the Second Cause of Action of plaintiff's
complaint with prejudice and dismissing defendant's counterclaim
for liquidated damages in excess of $8,400.00 incurred after
April 1, 1972 with prejudice.

(R.37, 38). No post-judgment

motions were filed by plaintiff and on April 20, 1976 plaintiff
filed its Notice of Appeal herein (R.39).

Plaintiff-appellant

will be hereinafter styled plaintiff and defendant-respondent
will be hereinafter styled defendant.
RELIEF SOUGHT ON APPEAL
Defendant seeks to affirm in all respects the Findings
of Fact, Conclusions of Law and Judgment made and entered herein
by the trial court.
STATEMENT OF FACTS
Defendant cannot agree with plaintiff's Statement of
Facts because the facts are there stated for the most part in
a light most favorable to plaintiff, who lost below, and in so
doing violates the time-honored rule that the facts on appeal
must be reviewed in the light most favorable to the Findings and
Judgment below.

The main objection to plaintiff's Statement of

Facts goes to its emphasis on facts favorable to plaintiff's
position while either ignoring or only paying lip service to
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those which are unfavorable to it.

And so, defendant believes it

not only proper, but essential that a statement be made setting
forth the facts of the case as found by the trial court and as
supported by the evidence with appropriate references to the
exhibits (Ex. ) , the file and transcript (R. ) , abstract of
transcript (A, ) and Findings of Fact (F. ).
The overall project comprised the construction of culinary
water facilities to supply culinary water to the rural inhabitants
of the North Myton Bench, South Myton Bench, Pleasant Valley and
the inhabitants of Myton, Utah consisting of some 65 miles of
pipelines and five equalizing reservoirs and pumping facilities
(Exs. P-2, P-3; A.%, R.436; A.104, R.474).

It was to be financed

with a loan and grant from the Farmers Home Administration. (Ex.
P-2, §1.1.05, p.1.1).
The plans and specifications were prepared by Nielsen
and Maxwell, consulting engineers employed by defendant.

The

overall project was divided into two separate projects for bidding
purposes, ie. Schedule A, being all construction north of the
Duchesne River and Schedule B, being all construction south of
the Duchesne River.

(A.88, R.435).

The invitation for bids was

set up such that contractors could bid on either Schedule A or
Schedule B or both (A.88, 89; R.435).

There was only one point

where the two schedules would connect which would work out well
for two contractors if that were the way it went.

(A.88, R.435).

It was anticipated that a six-months construction period
was ample to construct each schedule with proper equipment.
R.436; A.105, R.476).

(A.89,

An additional 90 days was allowed to cover
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the winter period, if necessary.

(A.89, R.436).

And so, defendant

made the decision to fix the contract completion time at 270 days
knowing that to crowd a contractor on time would result in a higher
bid, but if ample time is given the best bid is obtained,
436).

(R.435,

The entire project had to be completed within 270 calendar

days whether each schedule was constructed by different contractors
or by the same contractor.

(Ex. P-2, §1.3.08, p.l.5d; §2.5.02,

p.2.16).
Prior to bidding, R. C. Tolman, president of plaintiff,
toured the construction area in an automobile with other contractors and R. J. Mathews, then a member of the board of directors
of defendant.

(A.41, R.251; A.58, R.306).

Mr. Mathews pointed

out trouble spots such as the Dry Gulch crossing and the rocky
and steep conditions on R line to which Mr. Tolman responded "no
problem".

They observed the wet areas through the salt grass,

the alkalais, the willows and rock outcrops and this sort of
thing.

(A.58, R.307).

Mr. Tolman stayed over another day and

went over the project again, visiting the tank sites and getting
himself closer familiar with existing conditions.

He then came

out prior to the bid-opening day and visited the site some more
and worked up his bid in Roosevelt in a motel.

(A.15, R.130).

Before bidding the job, Mr. Tolman read the contract
documents and was familiar with §1.2.01 of the specifications
(Ex. P-2, §1.2.01 d., p.1.2) requiring the contractor to inform
himself as to the local conditions.

(A.41, R.250).

Prior to

submitting his bid Mr. Tolman knew that the job was going to
terminate in February, 1972 because of the 270-day provision.(A- 41)
(R.251).
- 4 -

Plaintiff then bid on both Schedule A at $360,735.00 and
Schedule B at $245,070.06 for a total of $605,805.96 for both.
(Ex. P-2 pp.1.5a., 1.5c).

In plaintiff's proposal, Mr. Tolman

verified that he had examined the location of the proposed work,
the drawings, specifications and other contract documents and was
familiar with the local conditions where the work was to be performed.

(Ex. P-2, §1.3.03, p.1.4, R.255).
The bid opening was held on March 11, 1971 and plaintiff's

bid was the low bid on each schedule.

Defendant had 60 days

after the bid opening date within which to award the contract.
(Ex. P-2, §1.2.Oil, p. 1.2; A.42, R.254).

Defendant's Board of

Directors awarded the contract to plaintiff on May 7, 1971 being
within the 60-day period (A.90, R.438; A.106, R.478) being soon
after completion of the legal documents with the Farmers Home
Administration for release of the funds.

(A.55, R.297).

Plaintiff and defendant entered into a written contract
dated May 7, 1971, under which plaintiff agreed to furnish all
the necessary materials, labor, equipment, tools and services
necessary for the complete construction of the Culinary Water
Facilities under both Schedule A and Schedule B near Myton, Utah
in accordance with the drawings, specifications and other contract
documents prepared by defendant's engineer and that the total
contract price based upon unit prices of the estimated quantities
of work and material, was the sum of $605,805.96.

However, under

the terms of said contract the right was reserved in defendant to
increase or decrease any item or items of work by 25% and sequential
deletions of lines were specifically provided for in case const- 5 -

ruction funds were inadequate to complete the designated construction as bid.

(Ex. P-2, §3.1, par. 5, p,3.L).

The total contract

price would be adjusted according to the actual quantities of
work and materials constructed and completed by plaintiff in
accordance therewith.

(Exs. P-2, P-3; F.2, R.29; F.6, R.30).

Notice to Proceed was issued on May 17, 1971 (Ex. P. 6;
A.2, R.63) and under the terms of the contract (Ex. P-2, §2.5.02,
p.2.16) plaintiff agreed to commence the work and complete the
entire construction of the culinary water facilities under both
Schedule A and Schedule B on or before February 18, 1972 being
27 0 calendar days after the commencement of the contract time on
May 24, 1971, (Ex. P-2, §1.3.08, p.l.5d) and the parties agreed
that in the event plaintiff did not complete the work by February 18, 1972, liquidated damages in the amount of $100.00 per day
on Schedule A plus $100.00 per day on Schedule B, for a total of
$200.00 per day on Schedules A and B combined would be paid by
plaintiff to defendant for each consecutive calendar day after
February 18, 1972 during which the work remained uncompleted
(Ex. P-2, §1.3.09, p. 1.5d; §1.4.07a., p.1.8) and the trial court
so found. (F.3, R.29).
Plaintiff commenced construction of the work on or about
June 7, 1971, being three weeks after the Notice to Proceed was
issued.

From the beginning, plaintiff began incessant "leap

frogging11, ie. construct a ways, for some reason jump to a spot
down the line in the system,
to plaintiff's attention.

(R.4 39) ancj w a s repeatedly called

(Ex. P-41, R.466; Ex. D-64, R.427).

As to the surface water conditions, there were wet areas
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but not large amounts of irrigation waters or surface waters
flowing into the trenches during construction (A.65, R.339; A.59,
R.310; R.409; A.93, R.446).

Farmers in the area attempted to

cooperate with plaintiff in an effort to reduce the waste water
problems.

for example, the witness Calvin Monks withheld taking

his water on two occasions to accommodate plaintiff and he lost
production because of it.

(A.78, 79, R.391-393 inclusive).

Likewise, the witness Frank Liddell held his water off.

(R.407).

The witness Harold White, as Watermaster for Dry Gulch Irrigation
Company, shifted part of the water from the North Township Ditch
along the Ioka Road to the South Township Ditch to accommodate
plaintiff's construction (A.85, R.417, 418). He held the water
out of one ditch for two weeks during which the farmers missed
two turns and were getting pretty upset.

(A.86, R.419).

water out of another lateral for more than two turns.

He held

(A.87,

R.419, 424). All of the witnesses who lived in the area testified that the water conditions encountered were normal for this
area.

(A.10, R.112; 378, 398-400 incl., 425; A.86, R.420).
The trial court found that the contract dated May 7,

1971 required plaintiff to control the ground water and to prevent surface waters from entering the trenches and excavations
and to make adequate provision therefore in the installation and
construction of the culinary water facilities; that the delays,
if any, in the performance of the work by plaintiff caused by
ground water or surface waters resulted from the failure of
plaintiff to adequately control or make provision therefor; and
that the construction conditions caused by the ground waters and
- 7 -

surface waters did not result from any act, or omission, or
conduct of defendant.

(F.ll, R.31, 32),

As to the cemented cobblerock, the specifications were
drawn such that the bidders would be responsible to make their
own field investigations.

Field inspections with the natives

were set up and prospective bidders could see from road cuts
and from all evidence on the ground as to what would be involved
and in that manner make their own determinations of what their
costs would be.

(A.89, R.437).

On a project of this type scat-

tered out for 65 miles, it would be meaningless for the owner to
auger holes to determine sub-surface conditions and to do so might
impose liability if representations with auger holes turned out
to be different.

(A.89, R.436, A.104, 105, R.474).

The cond-

itions encountered with respect to cobblerock and "hard pan" and
the quicksand are conditions normal for the area, and if one were
familiar with the soil variations he would expect to encounter
these on the Myton Bench.

(A.7, R.96).

The specifications provide that no classification of
excavated materials will be made for excavation and backfill for
pipelines (Ex. P-2, §4.4, par. 2, p.4.10) and structural excavation (Ex. P-2, §4.1, par. 3, p.4.1) shall include the removal
and subsequent handling of all water, earth, shale, loose or
cemented gravel, loose rock, solid rock and other materials of
whatever nature excavated or otherwise removed in the performance of the contract work.
§4.4, par. 5(b), p.4.11).

(Ex. P-2, §4.1, par. 3, p.4.1;
Mr. Tolman knew when he bid this job

that under the above specifications he would have to excavate
- 8 -

whatever material he encountered (A.44, R.262) or existed along
the alignment of the pipeline as shown on the plans, whether he
encountered sand, conglomerate or clay and that was the risk he
takes as a contractor.

(A.44, R.263).

The trial court found that the plans and specifications
furnished by defendant to plaintiff adequately located, described
and covered the nature and extent of the culinary water facilities
to be constructed and the general construction conditions to be
encountered and that the evidence fails to show that such plans
or specifications were inaccurate or deficient in any material
respect.

(F.9, R.31).
During the course of construction there were 13 changes

in line locations that were more noticeable than a foot or two,
none of which were covered by a change order, but were field
changes handled by the inspectors and project engineer where
there was no particular change in contract amount or time.
R.294).

(A.54,

The 13 changes are shown in red on Exhibit D-61 covering

Schedule A and Exhibit D-62 covering Schedule B and are incorporated into the as-built drawings marked Exhibits D-58 and D-59.
(A.93, 94; R.294, 449). The nature and extent of each change was
detailed by the witness Maxwell, practically all of which were
either requested by plaintiff or were made to accommodate the
plaintiff by either easier construction or to give him more room
to work.

(A.93-95 incl., R.446-449 incl.).
The trial court found that the work performed by plaintiff

in the construction of the culinary water facilities was pursuant
to and within the scope of the contract dated May 7, 1971, and
- 9 -

the terms and provisions thereof are controlling on the rights
and obligations of the party; that minor changes in the alignment
of some segments of the pipelines were made primarily for the
benefit of plaintiff and at its request; that such changes and
other minor modifications did not materially change the construction of the culinary water facilities project; and that the
evidence, when viewed in the light most favorable to plaintiff,
is wholly insufficient to show that the work performed by plaintiff was without or beyond the scope of said contract or that
there was any material deviation therefrom.

(F.19, R.34).

During construction, a new classification of rock was
agreed upon resulting in two change orders.

(Ex. D-67; A.101,

R.466a, 467). Change Order One dated October 21, 1971 covered
an increase in the quantity of rock excavated and Change Order
Two dated November 22, 1971 covered a decrease in the quantity
of rock excavated as a result of a new classification of rock.
(A.101, R.466a, 467). Adjustments to the contract price were
made by the Change Orders, but there was no adjustment in the
contract time.

(Ex. D-67; Ex. P-2, §2.5.05, p.2.16).

The trial court found that during the course of construction of the culinary water facilities, minor items of extra work
were performed by plaintiff and items of work were deleted and
adjustments were made to the total contract price therefore, all
by and with the agreement of the parties, and the evidence fails
to show that any work not contemplated by or provided for in the
contract has been performed by plaintiff for which plaintiff has
not been paid.

(F.13, R.32, 33).
- 10 -

The furnishing of water for testing the completed
system was left to the option of the contractor.
473).

(A.104, R.472,

However, if the water from the well was available, the

plaintiff could use it but there was no commitment as to time.
(A.104, R.472, 473). The specifications required plaintiff to
furnish all materials for completion of the project which included testing of the lines, and there is no provision requiring the
defendant to furnish the testing water.

(A.45, R.264, 265).

The trial court found that the contract dated May 7,
1971 required plaintiff to furnish all water for construction
purposes, including water for pressure testing, disinfection,
flushing and placing the culinary water facilities into service
and the evidence fails to show that defendant failed to furnish
any of the facilities required of it under said contract.

(F.10,

R.31) .
There were some $19,000 in project work deleted under the
25% deductible alternative with no corresponding shortening in
contract time.

(A.49, R.279).

The deducted items were adjusted

by the final change order and the final total contract price was
adjusted to the sum of $585,749.78.

(A.101, R.467, F.6, R.30).

During the course of construction, plaintiff was repeatedly advised of numerous deficiencies in the manner in which the
construction of work was proceeding including clean-up work, improper compaction of back-filled trenches, skipping of sections
of lines, failure to control water in the trenches, turnover of
job personnel and their lack of experience and that the specifications were not being adhered to.

(Ex. P-41; Ex. D-64, letters

- 11 -

dated August 16, 1971, August 31, 1971, September 1, 1971).

Like-

wise plaintiff was notified that he was behind schedule, would need
to double his rate of progress to complete the project within the
contract time, that the liquidated damage provision would be enforced and that extensions of time were not justified.

(Ex. D-64,

letters dated October 15, 1971, October 16, 1971, November 26, 1971,
January 12, 1972).
Plaintiff did not finally complete the entire work required
under Schedule A or Schedule B until July 31, 1972 when defendant
issued its Certificate of Completion thereon.

However, the work

required under both Schedule A and Schedule B was substantially
completed by April 1, 1972 being 42 calendar days late when water
was placed in the culinary water facilities and was available for
use by defendant and its consumers.

(A.54, R.295; A.82, R.403;

A.98, R.460; F.4, R.30).
The trial court found that the failure of plaintiff to
complete the work required of it under the contract dated May 7,
1971 by February 18, 1972 resulted solely from the acts and conduct of plaintiff and its failure to complete the work in a
reasonable and prudent manner; its failure to properly organize
and schedule its work; and

its failure to provide adequate crews,

equipment and machinery to perform the work under the conditions
encountered; that such conditions were normal for the area in
which the work was performed and which the plaintiff knew or
should have known would exist.

(F.8, R.31).

During the period February 19, 1972 to July 31, 1972
defendant provided inspection services on the work performed
- 12 -

by plaintiff during that period on the construction of the culinary water facilities for which defendant incurred extra and
additional costs and expenses in the sum of $8,500.00.
D-70; R.458).

(Ex.

The trial court found that such inspection services

were necessary to insure continued construction of the culinary
water facilities by plaintiff in accordance with the contract
documents; and that such additional inspection services and
expenses incurred by defendant were the direct result of the
failure of the plaintiff to complete the contract work on or
before February 18, 1972 as required by the contract dated May
7, 1971.

(R.457, 458; F.5, R.30).

Defendant retained the sum of $8,400.00 from its final
payment to plaintiff as liquidated damages for the 42-calendarday delay in substantial completion based upon the amount of
$200.00 per day on Schedules A and B combined for the period
February 19, 1972 to March 31, 1972 inclusive and defendant paid
to the plaintiff the total sum of $577,349.78 under the contract
dated May 7, 1971.

(R.18, A.82, R.404; F.7, R.30, 31).

The trial court found that the plaintiff breached the
contract dated May 7, 1971 by its failure to complete the work
required under Schedule A and Schedule B by February 18, 1972
without reasonable cause for delay and as a direct result thereof
defendant was damaged by the delay in providing culinary water
to its consumers and by incurring additional and extra costs and
expenses for inspection services in the sum of $8,500.00 during
the period of delay.

(F.17, R.33, 34).
- 13 -

The trial court further found that the contract dated
May 7, 1971 was substantially completed on April 1, 1972 and the
amount of $8,400.00 deducted from the contract price by defendant,
as liquidated damages during the period from February 19, 1972 to
March 31, 1972 inclusive, being 42 calendar days, is within the
terms of said contract and is the agreed and liquidated damages
and is reasonable and is not a penalty.

(F.18, R.34).

The trial court specifically found that defendant fully
complied with the terms and provisions of the contract dated
May 7, 1971 in all material respects, and fully performed all
of the duties and obligations required of it thereunder, and
there has been no breach by defendant of any of the terms or
provisions of said contract.

(F.16, R.33).

ARGUMENT
Introduction
While it is true that the trial court in its Memorandum
Decision (R.26) ruled against plaintiff because plaintiff failed
to prove any of its claims by a preponderance of the evidence,
it is equally true that the trial court made specific findings
of fact against plaintiff on each of its claims.

(R.28-34 incl.).

Plaintiff asserts that it sustained its burden and there is no
relevant or material evidence to the contrary.
not sol

That simply is

The facts of this case were hotly contested as witnessed

by some 437 pages of transcript and 72 exhibits.

The record in

this case is replete with oral and documentary evidence contradictory to plaintifffs contentions.

To say as plaintiff does
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that this case does not involve a conflict in facts is absurd.
The whole controversy revolved around whether the delay
in completing the project resulted from plaintiff's own acts
and conduct or the alleged conduct on the part of the defendant.
The trial court specifically found that the delays were plaintiff's
own doing and did not result from any act or conduct of the
defendant.

(F.14, R.33).

To say that defendant offered no evidence to counter-act
plaintiff's enumerable summaries of the time consumed in extensive
leapfrogging, etc., and costs involved misses the point.

Defend-

ant's evidence went to the heart of the cause of the delays, ie.
the plaintiff's conduct or misconduct in failing to properly construct or complete the project within the project time.

The cold,

hard facts are that the trial court simply did not believe the
plaintiff's story and that should end it.
Defendant cannot agree that the justification or lack
thereof of the plaintiff's delays hinge primarily on the interpretation of the contract documents and applicable law.

Rather,

there was a sharp conflict in the evidence as to whether the
claimed flooding or winter weather were as bad as plaintiff says
or even impeded plaintiff's work, particularly in light of the
inadequate equipment and personnel employed by plaintiff to do
the job.

Suffice it to say, the trial court found the facts

against plaintiff on both scores.
To say that plaintiff's ability to prevail on its claims
for delays because of cobblerock conditions and flooding depends
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primarily on its justification in relying upon the Soil Condition
specification (Ex, P-2, §3.1 , par. 2, p.3.1.) is not only preposterous, but overlooks
(1) plaintiff's duty to visit the site of the work and
fully inform itself as to all existing conditions and limitations (Ex. P-2, §1.2.Old, p.1.2) and plaintiff's verification
that it did so (Ex. P-2, §1.3.03, p.1.4);
(2) The no-classification of materials specification for
excavation and backfill for pipelines (Ex. P-2, §4.4, par. 2,
p.4.10);
(3) plaintiff's obligation to keep the trenches free
from water during excavation, pipe-laying and backfilling and to
prevent surface waters from entering the trenches (ibid. par.
4, p.4.10;
(4) requirements for excavation in ledge rock, cobblerock,
stones, mud or other materials unsuitable for pipe foundation
(ibid. par. 5(b), p.4.11, and
(5) the no-classification of excavated materials for
structural excavation requiring removal and handling of all
water, shale, loose or cemented gravel, loose rock, solid rock,
and the control of both surface and ground water (Ex. P-2, §4.1,
par. 3, p.4.1).
Likewise, plaintiff simply assumes that the defendant
was required to furnish testing and chlorinization water without
citing any specification or provision in the contract documents
which require defendant to do so and all the while ignoring
(1) plaintiff's obligation to furnish all the necessary
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materials, labor, equipment, tools and services necessary for
the complete construction of the culinary water facilities

(Ex.

P-2, §1.3.02, p.1.4);
(2) plaintiff's obligation to provide and pay for water
for construction (Ex. P-2, §3.1, par. 6, p.3.2);
(3) that payments per foot of pipe shall be full compensation for excavation and backfill, furnishing and installing
the pipe complete with bedding (including import of select bedding
material where native material is not satisfactory), removal and
disposal of excess excavated material, pressure testing, disinfection, flushing and placing the line into service (Ex. P-2, §3.2,
par. 2, p.3.4), and
(4) that plaintiff was required to test, flush and disinfect the water lines upon completion of the system at plaintiff's
expense.

(Ex. P-2, §4.13, par. 2, p.4.26).
Plaintiff's assertions that the plans and specifications

were inadequate in the particulars claimed were hotly and factually contested and the trial court squarely found that the
plans and specifications furnished by defendant to plaintiff
adequately located, described and covered the nature and extent
of the culinary water facilities to be constructed and the
general conditions to be encountered. (F.9, R.31).

Such finding

is fully supported by the evidence in this case as documented
under the foregoing Statement of Facts.

That being so, plaintiff

should not be heard to complain about it on this appeal.
The sum and substance of it all is that plaintiff bid
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this job on the same specifications and under the same conditions
as did the other competitive bidding contractors.

Plaintiff's

troubles on this job resulted solely from its conduct or misconduct and if plaintiff lost money as a result thereof, it
should not expect defendant to bail it out to the tune of
$113,889.98 or any sum.

Plaintiff's self-caused delays cost

the defendant an additional $8,500.00 in inspection fees which
defendant should not have to absorb.

That's the way the trial

court saw it and that is the way it should be.
POINT I
UNDER THE CARDINAL RULES OF APPELLATE REVIEW, THE
FINDINGS, CONCLUSIONS AND JUDGMENT OF THE TRIAL COURT
IN THIS CASE MUST BE AFFIRMED.
In its appeal, plaintiff takes exception to all findings
and conclusions, urging that plaintiff had sustained its burden
and that there is no relevant and material evidence to the
contrary.

(App. Brief, p.14).

After reading some 107 pages of

the Abstract of Record prepared by plaintiff and 4 37 pages of
transcript and 72 exhibits, such assertion has to be a most
startling revelation.

Suffice it to say, the record is replete

with contradictory evidence and testimony and the facts as found
by the trial court are fully supported thereby.
Dispositive of this appeal is Charlton v. Hackett, 11 Utah
2d

389, 360 P.2d 176 (1961) wherein this court held that in

considering such an attack on the Findings and Judgment of the
trial court, it is the duty of this court to follow these cardinal
rules of review, to-wit:
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(1) To indulge them a presumption of validity and
correctness;
(2) To require the appellant to sustain the burden of
showing error;
(3) To review the record in the light most favorable to
them; and
(4) Not to disturb them if they find substantial support
in the evidence.
As to (1) and (2) above, the presumptions favor the
correctness and credibility of the Findings and Judgment, and the
burden of showing that they are in error and should be overturned
is upon the attackee.

Hardy v. Hendrickson, 27 Utah 2d 251, 495

P.2d 28 (1972); First Security Bank of Utah, N.A. v. Wright,
Utah 2d 521 P.2d 563 (1974).
As to (3) above, plaintiff recites the evidence most
favorable to its contentions, to the exclusion of other evidence
favorable to defendant, which is not permissible on appellate
review.

Thomson v. Condas, 27 Utah 2d 129, 493 P.2d 639 (1972).

The established rule of review on appeal is that this Court
surveys the evidence in the light favorable to the trial court's
Findings, First Western Fidelity v. Gibbons and Reed Co., 27 Utah
2d. 1, 492 P.2d 132 (1971).

Plaintiff has leaned largely on facts

favorable to itself to the exclusion of other facts of contradictory nature which appear in the record.

The opposite is the

correct rule here ie.,the evidence favorable to defendant must be
considered to the exclusion of contrary evidence, Hoggan & Hall &
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Higgins, Inc. v. Hall, 18 Utah 2d 3, 414 P.2d 89 (1966).
As to (4) above, it is the trial court's prerogative
to determine the facts in a breach of contract action.

Santi

v. Denver & Rio Grande Western Railroad Co., 21 Utah 2d 157,
442 P.2d 921 (1968), and this being an action at law as noted
in Leon Glazier and Sons, Inc. v. Larsen, 26 Utah 2d 429, 491
P.2d 226 (1971) it needs no citation of authorities that if
there is substantial evidence to support the Judgment of the
court below, this court will affirm.
More important, here is the rule of appellate review
governing the refusal of a trial court to make Findings essential to appellant's cause.

Here plaintiff claims that the

trial court should have held as a matter of law that the
plaintiff had sustained its burden of proof on its various
claims (App. Brief p.49).

Thus, plaintiff's basic assertion

of error is the refusal of the trial court to find in favor
of plaintiff on its specific claims.

The correct rule in

such instance is that unless the evidence is such that all
reasonable minds would so conclude and thus compel such a
finding, this court will not upset the trial court's refusal
to so find.
458

P.2d

Park v. Alta Ditch & Canal Co., 2 3 Utah 2d 86,
625 (1969) First Western Fidelity v. Gibbons & Reed

Co., Supra; Erickson v. Bennion, 28 Utah 2d
(1972),

371, 503 P.2d 139

Conversely, if there is any reasonable basis in the evid-

ence upon which the trial court, acting fairly thereon, could remain unconvinced, then this court will not command that such a finding be made.

People's Finance and Thrift v. Landes, 28 Utah 2d 392,
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503 P.2d 444 (1972),

The rule is well stated in First Western

Fidelity v. Gibbons and Reed Co., Supra, on page 3 of the Utah
Reports as follows:
Where the appellant's position is that the trial
court erred in refusing to make certain findings
essential to its right to recover, and insists that
the evidence compels such findings, it is obligated
to show that there is credible and uncontradicted
evidence which proves those contended facts with
such certainty that all reasonable minds must so
find. Conversely, if there is any reasonable basis,
either in the evidence or from the lack of evidence
upon which reasonable minds might conclude that they
are not so convinced by a preponderance of the
evidence, then the findings should not be overturned.
(Emphasis added).
Thus, the evidence in this case, as hereinabove summarized
in defendant's Statement of Facts, with direct references to the
record and transcript, make it abundantly clear that the findings
of the trial court are, in fact, supported by substantial, competent evidence in the Record.

It is plaintiff's burden in this

appeal to show the contrary which plaintiff has wholly failed
to do.

Likewise, it is plaintiff's burden to show that there

is credible and uncontradicted evidence which proves plaintiff's
contended facts with such certainty that all reasonable minds
must so find which plaintiff again has wholly failed to do.

That

being so, the findings of the trial court should not be disturbed
on this appeal.

And since the Conclusions of Law are predicated

upon and are supported by the findings, such conclusions must be
affirmed.

Likewise, since the Judgment follows the conclusions,

it too must be affirmed herein.
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POINT II
THE EVIDENCE SUPPORTS THE FINDINGS OF THE TRIAL
COURT THAT THE PLANS AND SPECIFICATIONS ADEQUATELY
DESCRIBED AND COVERED THE GENERAL CONSTRUCTION
CONDITIONS.
The trial court specifically found that the plans and
specifications furnished by defendant to plaintiff adequately
described and covered the general construction conditions to
be encountered.

(F.9, R.31).

Plaintiff challenges the fore-

going finding and contends that the Soils Conditions specification
(Ex. P-2, §3.1, par. 2, p.3.1) standing alone is defective
as a matter of law while acknowledging that plaintiff was obliged
to and did verify that it was familiar with the local conditions
where the work was to be performed.

(Ex. P-2, §1.3.03, p.1.4).

Yet plaintiff chooses to ignore the no-classification of materials
specification for excavation and backfill of pipelines (Ex. P-2,
§4.4, par. 2, p.4.10), and the special instructions covering
excavation for trenches in ledgerock, cobblerock, stones, mud,
etc., (ibid. par. 5(b), p.4.11) and the Control of Ground-Water
specifications (ibid. par. 4, p.4.10) requiring plaintiff to
keep trenches free from water and to prevent surface water from
entering the trenches.

More so, plaintiff ignores the admission

of Mr. Tolman that at the time he bid the job he knew that the
above no-classification of materials specification required him
to excavate whatever material he ran into (A.44, R.262, 263)
whether it was sand or conglomerate or clay or whatever because
that is the risk he takes as a contractor.
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(R.263).

Yet plaintiff1

own witness, Arnold, testified that the conditions encountered
with respect to the cobble and hardpan and quicksand were normal
or customary for most of the area (R.95) which could have been
discovered through inquiry and were no surprise to him (R.96).
Likewise, plaintiff1s own witness, Ivie, testified that the
conditions experienced with respect to ground water and sand were
normal conditions for that area.

(R.114).

Plaintiff's repeated criticisms of the defendant for not
conducting subsurface investigations can be put to rest by the
testimony of defendant's consulting engineer Maxwell.

(R.436,

437, 474). The substance thereof is that it is not the normal
practice in a project of this type scattered out over 65 miles
to prepare borings to determine sub-surface conditions.

Such

borings become quite meaningless because it is not feasible to
represent every change in material.

It is the option of the owner

to do so and if done could be misleading and subject the owner
to some liability.

In this case, plaintiff chose another route,

ie. that the bidders would be responsible to make their own
field investigations.

A field inspection was set up where they

could talk to the natives, ask all the questions they would, and
see from road cuts, waterways, etc., and from all evidences on
the ground as to what would be involved and in this manner they
could determine what their costs would be.
Mr. Tolman made the field inspection and when problem
areas were pointed out, his response was "no problem".

He

returned to the job site on two more occasions and when he made
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up his bid, he knew what the specifications said or didn't say
and if there was any uncertainty about construction conditions he
could have hedged his bet to cover all contingencies and bid
accordingly or he didn't have to bid at all.

After having done

so, he should not be heard now to complain that the specifications
did not properly inform him of the prevailing construction conditions.
As to the water conditions about which plaintiff complains,
there is conflicting evidence as to just how bad it was or to
what extent, if any, it affected the progress of construction.
For example, defendant's witness Major testified that during the
trial (late February, 1976) he rode over the project areas shown
on Exhibit P-17 in red as being wet areas encountered during
construction and in his opinion 75% of those areas were wet that
day.

(A.65, R.338).

Likewise, during construction he did not

recall seeing large amounts of irrigation water and except for
points of canal crossings or river crossings, he didn't recall
seeing any surface water flowing into the trenches.

(R.338).

Thus, plaintiff's characterization of the surface water conditions are eitherly grossly exaggerated or imaginary and plaintiff's
suggestion that defendant had the responsibility therefore just
isn't so.
Plaintiff seems to suggest that §4.4, par. 10(d), p.4.13
of Ex. P-2 somehow places the responsibility on the Owner (defendant) to control the surface water in the borrow pits where most of
the construction took place.

A simple reading thereof demonstrates

that the only responsibilities of the Owner (defendant) related
to the trench crossing farming areas to correlate the construction
- 24 -

with farming operations to minimize damage to crops.

That was

the sole nature and extent of defendant's responsibility in this
regard.
The case of U. S. v. Atlantic Dredging Company, 253 U.S.
1 (1920) cited on pages 25-27 of Appellant's Brief is clearly
distinguishable from the instant case.

There the government

made borings into the bed of the Delaware River which revealed
impenetrable material and represented on the map exhibited to
the bidders that the material to be encountered was "mainly mud
or mud mixed with an admixture of sand".

There was nothing on

the map showing the field notes taken at the time the borings
were made.

Furthermore, the bid proposals required the bidder

to describe the character and capacity of the plant proposed
to be used which was approved by the government's contracting
officer.

The approved plant was adequate for dredging the mater-

ials described on the map but inadequate for dredging the materials encountered.

Upon learning that impenetrable materials had

been reached by the borings, Atlantic refused to complete the job.
Under those circumstances, the Supreme Court held that
the case came within the principle "that the contractor ought
to be relieved, if he was misled, by erroneous statements in
the specifications" and affirmed the judgment of the court of
claims awarding the contractor its losses incurred because of
misrepresentations as to existing conditions.

Here plaintiff

makes no claim that defendant misrepresented the existing conditions, but asserts only that the specifications did not adequately
inform plaintiff of the prevailing construction conditions.
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Likewise, Hollerback v, U. S,, 233 U.S. 165 (1914) cited
on page 27 of Appellant's Brief is clearly distinguishable from
the instant case.
existing dam.

There the contract covered the repair of an

The government specifications specifically repres-

ented that the dam was backed for about 50 feet with broken
stone, sawdust and sediment to a height of within 2 or 3 feet
of the crest when in fact such conditions did not exist.

The

Supreme Court held that the positive statement of such specification must be taken as true and binding upon the government
and that the loss resulting from such misrepresentation must fall
upon the government rather than the contractor even though the
general specifications required the contractor to visit the
site and ascertain the nature of the work.

However, the Supreme

Court noted that if the government wished to leave the matter
open for the independent investigation of the claimants, it
might easily have omitted the specification as to the character
of the filling back of the dam which is akin to the instant case.
It then noted that in its positive assertion, the government made
a representation upon which claimants had the right to rely without an investigation to prove its falsity.
The so-called test of "justifiable reliance upon the
plans and specifications'1, while not yet adopted in Utah so far
as our research reveals, is of no moment here since there is no
claim of misrepresentation in the plans and specifications.

The

Montana case of Hash v. Sundling and Sons, Inc., 436 P.2d 83
(1967) cited on page 29 of Appellant's Brief is of no help here
since there the sub-contractor was required to excavate to a
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greater depth than that stated in the plans and specifications
and it was only when he was required to go deeper than the sub-grade
as established by the plans and specifications and as staked on
the ground that he encountered the excessii/e wetness that required
the additional work for which he sought recovery.

Furthermore,

the foreseeability of the conditions actually encountered was
held to be purely and simply a question of fact and the trial
court having determined such fact adversely to the defendant
Sunderling based upon conflicting evidence foreclosed his contentions on appeal.
In the Montana case of Haggart Construction Co. v. State
of Montana, 427 P.2d 686 (1967) cited on page 29 of Appellant's
Brief, the State misrepresented that acceptable surfacing materials
could be produced economically and in sufficient quantities for
the proposed construction from three State^optioned gravel pits
which were royalty free.

The trial court found, among other

things, that the gravel in all three pits was not suitable for
the intended use.

The State did not deny that the representations

were misleading inasmuch as the gravel obtained was not of the
quality indicated.

Rather, the State relied on the exculpatory

language in the contract.

The Montana Court held that the

representations of the State as to fitness of the gravel pits
constituted a warranty and it could not hide behind the exculpatory
language of the contract.

However, it emphasized that it was

not its holding that such exculpatory clause may not be enforced
in other situations.
Both Stock and Grove, Inc. v. U. S t , 493 F.2d 629 (1974)
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and U. S. v. Johnson (153 F.2d 846, 9th Cir. 1946) cited on page
30 of Appellant's Brief involved misrepresentations by the government of the suitability of materials from specific sources of
supply for construction purposes and neither have any relevancy
here.

In both instances the lower tribunal found against the

government on the facts and awarded damages to the contractor.
In Stock and Grove, Inc., Supra, the Circuit Court noted that
while the contractor was not required to employ a trained geologist who might have discovered the latent indications, he was
not excused from making a site inspection or from discovering
patent indications plainly, to a layman, contradicting the contract documents.
A reading of the cases cited on pages 32 and 33 of
Appellant's Brief reveals that all of those cases are clearly
distinguishable from the instant case and none of those cases
are either controlling or persuasive under the facts of the
instant case.

More pointedly, we are at a loss to understand

what bearing the Utah case of P.L.C. Landscape Const, v. Piccadilly Fish 'N Chips, Inc., 28 Utah 2d 350, 502 P.2d 562 (1972)
has on the instant case since that case involved a subsequent
oral agreement to change the original contract which clearly is
not akin to this case.
The sum and substance of it all is that the trial court
specifically found that the plans and specifications were wholly
adequate under the controverted facts of this case and that
should end it.

Plaintifffs argument that defendant should have

conducted detailed subsurface investigations and should have in- 28 -

eluded the results thereof in the plans and specifications to
better inform the plaintiff is not only unrealistic but is unsupported by any respectable authority either cited in Appellantfs
Brief or otherwise•

It takes little imagination to realize that

had defendant conducted extensive borings and included those in
the plans and specifications, plaintiff would now be claiming
that the logs of those borings did not accurately represent the
subsurface conditions of some 65 miles of pipeline routes and
would be asking for additional compensation therefore.

We respect-

fully submit that plaintiff's argument under this point is wholly
without merit and should be treated accordingly.
POINT III
THE FINDING OF THE TRIAL COURT THAT DEFENDANT DID
NOT INTERFERE WITH PLAINTIFFfS PERFORMANCE OF THE
CONTRACT IS SUPPORTED BY SUBSTANTIAL EVIDENCE.
One of the most hotly contested fact questions was
whether there was any conflict between the plans and the easement
procured from Duchesne County to lay the pipelines within the
Duchesne County roads.

The trial court resolved that fact question

against plaintiff in its Findings of Fact Nos. 9, 15 and 16.
There was only one instance in which plaintiff was stopped by the
county (A.73, R.372) and that was on Line "C" when plaintiff
began excavating in the roadway for approximately 10 to 2 0 feet.
(A.67, R.343).

Plaintiff was not lined up between the design

stakes (A.73) which were off the shoulder of the road (R.343, 372)
approximately 11 feet from the fence.(A.101, R.344, 469). The
line was not flagged with lath since Mr. Tolman had not requested
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it (A.73, R.372).

The location of the line was referenced to the

fence as shown on the construction drawings (Ex. P-3) which was
in the borrow pit (R.375) and as finally constructed was three
feet from the fence line. (Ex. P-3, D-58, A.102, R.469).
The substance of it all is that plaintiff was not following the line as shown on the plans because it was down in the
borrow area.

Rather, he started his trench on the shoulder of

the road where it was easier digging.

After that incident, the

representatives of defendant met with County Commissioner Murray
and toured the project showing him where the proposed lines would
be located.

After that the line location was not a factor or a

problem with the county.

(A.77, R.387).

Key to it all is that under Specification No. 2.7.2
(Ex. P-2, p.2.22) the field locations of all pipelines were
established by drawings referenced to fixed objects, instructions
in the field or construction stakes in the field as may be
necessary.

Defendant emphatically disagrees with plaintiff's

assertion on page 38 of Appellant's Brief that there is no dispute in the evidence to the fact that the line was not properly
staked.

To the contrary, there is no evidence to show other-

wise with one exception through the Warr property and that was
corrected to the satisfaction of both parties.

(A.67, R.349, 350).

Exhibit P-3 showed the location of Line "C" referenced
to the fence which was in the borrow area and not upon the road
shoulder where plaintiff began digging and where plaintiff should
not have been.

Likewise, any changes in location of the pipe-
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lines about which plaintiff complains were for its benefit or at
its request and the trial court so found,

(F,19, R.34).

Plaintiff contends that plaintifffs work was interfered
with because of a conflict between the County Easement and the
contract plans which the trial court refused to so find.

To say

that there is credible and uncontradicted evidence in the record
of this case which proves those contended facts with such certainty
that all reasonable minds must so find is incredible.

Yet that

is plaintiff's burden on this appeal under the authorities cited
under Point I hereinabove.
Next plaintiff asserts that the trial court erred in
finding that plaintiff was required under the terms of the contract to furnish all water for testing, flushing, disinfecting
and placing the lines into service.

(F.10, R.31).

Plaintiff

says on page 40 of its Brief that there is no wording in §4.13
which requires the contractor to furnish the water required.
Yet plaintiff ignores its obligation to furnish all the necessary
materials, labor, etc., and services necessary for the complete
construction of the culinary water facilities and to furnish and
pay for water for construction and that its payments per foot of
pipe include pressure testing, disinfection, flushing and placing
the line into service, all at plaintiff's expense.

Likewise,

plaintiff ignores that nowhere in the contract is defendant required to furnish water or any other materials.

Rather, the

plans and specifications were prepared such that the contractor
would furnish his own water for construction.

(A.90, R.437).

The testing is for the purpose of discovering leaks
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(A.103, R.471) and water from an adjacent canal could be used
for that purpose but not for chlorination and final flushing.
(A.103, R.472, 473)•

We are at a loss to understand what is so

ridiculous about that as plaintiff suggests on page 41 of its
Brief.
To say that the portion of the letter quoted on page 42
of Appellant's Brief construed the specification in plaintiff's
favor is nonsense.

The letter tried to impress on plaintiff the

necessity for completing the base system such that water could
be delivered to Myton City as early as possible.

And as noted

by the witness Maxwell, if water was available from the well it
could be used for that purpose but there was no commitment as
to time.

(R.473).

The fact was that when water was finally

available from the well the plaintiff was permitted to use it
for testing.

And the fact that plaintiff was not charged for

it was a gratuity for which plaintiff should not complain.

The

referenced specification on page 41 of Appellant's Brief covers
sterilization of the Steel Reservoirs (Ex. P-2, §4.12, par. 4,
p. 4^5) and not the testing and disinfection of the water lines
which are covered by a different section of the specifications.
(Ex. P-2, §4.13, pp. 4.26, 4.27).

Thus, to say that the former

is superfluous completely misconstrues the applicable specifications.
In view of the above, there is substantial competent and
credible evidence in the record to support the findings of the
trial court that the contract required plaintiff to furnish all
water for construction purposes including water for testing, dis- 32 -

infection and flushing.

Plaintiff has wholly failed to meet its

burden on this appeal under its Point II as demonstrated above
and as such plaintiff's arguments therein are without merit.
POINT IV
THE TRIAL COURT DID NOT ERR IN HOLDING THAT IT
WAS NOT IMPROPER OR UNREASONABLE FOR DEFENDANT
TO REQUIRE PLAINTIFF TO COMPLETE THE WORK WITHIN
THE TIME SPECIFIED BY THE CONTRACT.
We are at a loss to understand how plaintiff can complain
that it was unreasonable for defendant to not award the contract
until 57 days after the bid opening when the Information For
Bidders specifically allowed the plaintiff 60 days after the
bid opening date to award the contract.
1.2).

(Ex. P-2, §1.201h, p.

At the time plaintiff submitted its bid, Mr. Tolman knew

that plaintiff had up to 60 days to award the contract (A.42,
R.252, 254) and that the project was to be financed by a loan
or grant from the Farmers Home Administration.

The fact is that

the contract was awarded within the 60-day period very soon after
completion of the legal documents with the Farmers Home Administration for a release of the funds.
Next

(A.55, R.297).

plaintiff complains that at several meetings in

December, 1971, plaintiff asked for permission to suspend the
work during the winter months which was rejected by defendant.
The facts are that by letter dated October 15, 1971 (Ex. D-64)
plaintiff was advised that it was behind schedule and was admonished that construction weather probably will be more adverse
during the last half of the contract and that very little or no
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construction can be completed after January 1, 1972.

Plaintiff

was further notified that construction would have to proceed at
approximately double the rate of progress to complete the project
within the contract time which would expire February 18, 1972
and plaintiff was reminded of the liquidated damages provision.
By letter dated December 20, 1971 (Ex. D-64) plaintiff was advised that defendant would consider amending the liquidated
damage provision of the contract if plaintiff would employ a
competent superintendent and give priority to specified items
of the work.

By letter dated January 12, 1972 (Ex. D-64) plaint-

iff was advised that weather conditions in the Myton area have
not been unusual or unexpected and plaintiff was again reminded
that the liquidated damage provision would be modified only if
the conditions specified were met which they were not.
It is significant that when additional ledgerock was
encountered, plaintiff made no request for additional time as
required by the contract.

Likewise when the new classification

of consolidated or semi-consolidated material was agreed upon,
plaintiff made no request for additional time. (Ex. D-64, letter
dated November 6, 1971).

Nor was any additional time provided

for in the change orders as required by the contract (Ex. D-67;
A.101, R.466a, 467; Ex. P-2, §2.505, p.2.16).

Equally signifi-

cant is that some $19,000.00 in contract work were deleted with
no corresponding reduction in contract time.
The sum and substance of it all is that a construction
period of six months on each schedule was considered ample for
both schedules and an additional 9 0 days leeway was added to
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arrive at the 270-day contract time.

The work under each sched-

ule could proceed independently of each other.

If, as here,

both schedules were constructed by the same contractor, all he
had to do was double his work force and equipment.

Mr. Tolman

knew that at the time plaintiff's bid was submitted.

He knew

that he could not get started until at least the latter part of
May, 1971.

Typical of his attitude is plaintiff's comment on

page 44 of its brief that when the contractor bid the contract
he contemplated doing the work within the 27 0 days, but anticipated that there would be appropriate extensions of time should
the 27 0 days go into the extremely cold winter months.

What

plaintiff is saying is that the 270-day provision really didn't
mean anything to it since if it got into trouble it could always
get an extension in the contract time.

Not so here.

The natives of the area who testified on the subject
stated that the 1971-72 winter weather conditions were normal
for the area (A.10, R.113; A.80, R.399) and the official weather
records verify the same.

(Ex. D-68, D-69).

The trial court specifically found that the contract
time was more than sufficient to complete the project; that no
additional time was requested by plaintiff to complete any of
the items of extra work and that any additional time required
for the performance thereof was more than offset by the time
allowed for the performance of the deleted work.

(F.12, R.32).

Accordingly, plaintiff's arguments are wholly without merit.
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POINT V
THE TRIAL COURT DID NOT ERR IN AWARDING DEFENDANT
THE RETAINED LIQUIDATED DAMAGES OF $8,400.00
The trial court found that plaintiff breached the contract
dated May 7, 1971 by its failure to complete the work without reasonable cause for delay and as a direct result thereof defendant
was damaged by the delay in providing culinary water to its consumers and by incurring additional extra costs for inspection in
the sum of $8,500.00. (F.17, R.33, 34). It further found that
the retained liquidated damages of $8,400.00 was the agreed
liquidated damages and was reasonable and not a penalty.
R.34).

(F.18,

The failure of plaintiff to complete the project within

the contract time resulted solely from plaintiff's conduct or
misconduct.

Thus, the case of Gogo, et al v. Los Angeles County

Flood Control District, 114 P.2d 65 (Calif. 1941) cited on page
48 of Appellant's Brief is simply not in point.

Likewise, the

Washington case of Bignold v. King County, 399 P.2d 611 (Wash.
1965) cited on pages 46 and 49 of Appellant's Brief is not in
point.

There the trial court found that the failure of the

county's engineers to shut down the job was arbitrary and capritious and that appellant was "locked in" by the findings which
negate the exercise of the requisite good faith by the county's
engineers.

Here the opposite is true.

The trial court specifi-

cally found that the winter weather conditions in the area of
the work were not unusually severe with the temperatures being
above normal and precipitation being near normal and the evidence failed to show that defendant unreasonably refused to grant
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plaintiff's request for an extension of time,

Accordingly,

plaintiff has wholly failed to sustain its burden on this point
in this appeal and under the accepted rules of appellant review
neither the Findings or Judgment of the trial court thereon
should be disturbed.
CONCLUSION
The trial court made and entered Findings favorable to
the defendant-

The presumption of the correctness and validity

of such Findings has not been overcome by plaintiff nor has it
demonstrated that there is no substantial evidence to support
such Findings or that the trial court misapplied the law.

The

record is replete with contradictory evidence and testimony on
all of plaintiff's contentions.

The refusal of the trial court

to make Findings favorable to plaintiff can only be disturbed
if the record shows credible and uncontradicted evidence which
proves plaintiff1s contentions with such certainty that all
reasonable minds must so find.

Clearly that is not the case

here.
The sum and substance of it all is that plaintiff failed
to complete the contract within the contract time solely as a
result of its own conduct or misconduct and it should not expect
defendant to bail it out to the tune of $113,899.98 or any sum.
Plaintiff's self-caused delays cost the defendant an additional
$8,500.00 in inspection fees which defendant should not have to
absorb.

The trial court was correct in every respect in the way

it decided this case and that decision should not be disturbed.
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It is respectfully submitted that the Findings, Conclusions and
Judgment of the trial court should be affirmed in all respects.
Respectfully submitted

(

J6sepfT Novak
Attorney for Defendant-Respondent
520 Continental Bank Building
Salt Lake City, Utah 84101
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